This study measures the proportion of real exchange rate movements that can be accounted for by movements in the relative price of non-traded goods among twenty-one bilateral AsianPacific real exchange rates. Following Engel (1999), the decomposition is done at all possible horizons that the data allow -from one month up to 25 years. For the most part, evidence presented here is consistent with that from his sample of (predominately) G7 countries. In particular, relative prices of non-traded goods appear to account for virtually none of the movements in Pacific Rim real exchange rates. This pattern appears unaffected by the crosssectional variation in either income level, or the degree of openness present among these Pacific-Rim economies. The exceptions to these results occur when we examine the drift in real exchange rates, and more generally, for fixed (or semi-fixed) exchange rate regimes.
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Introduction
This study provides new evidence on the share of real exchange rate movements that can be accounted for by deviations from purchasing power parity in traded goods. The primary motivation for this exercise is the influential evidence presented in Engel (1999) . For a sample of high-income countries, he showed that over the past thirty years, movements in relative prices of non-traded goods appear to account for essentially none of the movements in U.S. real exchange rates. That is, movements in aggregate real exchange rates overwhelmingly reflect deviations from purchasing power parity (PPP) among traded goods.
This finding is important, since many general approaches to modelling the real exchange rate are built on an assumption of PPP in traded goods. Indeed, as emphasized by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) , a role for relative traded goods prices in real exchange rate determination is absent in most standard theories. The evidence presented in this study focuses on the experience of six small, open, and generally fast growing Asian-Pacific economies.
Despite the striking nature of Engel's findings, there are several a priori reasons one might question their generality. First, the focus on larger, predominately western G-7 countries misses much of the impressive economic growth that has occurred over the last twenty-five years. It is possible that wide movements in the relative price of non-traded goods have accompanied these high rates of growth, and that the accompanying sectoral reallocations have influenced the behaviour of real exchange rates. Second, the exchange rate regime may itself be important. Recent studies have found significant effects on trade, growth, and economic integration (Rose 2000 , Frankel and Rose 2002 , and Parsley and Wei 2002 . Several of the economies included in this study pegged their exchange rates for extended periods (e.g., Hong Kong 1983 -present, Thailand 1990 , thus precluding nominal exchange rate adjustment. To the extent that the nominal exchange rate regime affects price dynamics, the real exchange rate may also be affected. Third, the Asian-Pacific economies are generally more reliant on external trade than the high-income industrial countries often studied. This openness may also affect real exchange rate dynamics. Finally, there are wide disparities in income levels among the Asian-Pacific economies themselves. Thus, an 2 interesting question is whether the benchmark presented in Engel (1999) is relevant to a set of countries with widely different economic circumstances.
Recent studies that have focused on the importance of relative non-traded goods prices in real exchange rate determination have had mixed results. Chinn (1996) finds some East Asian real exchange rates (Japan, Korea, the Philippines, and Singapore) do appear cointegrated with relative prices, while others (China, Indonesia, and Thailand) do not. For OECD countries, Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (1999) find mixed evidence for cointegration between real exchange rates and relative prices. Kakkar and Ogaki (1999) also find mixed results for the U.S., Japan, the U.K., and Canada. More recently, Chinn and Johnston (1999) and Strauss (1999) find somewhat stronger support for this linkage among OECD countries. This paper follows Engel (1999) and 'accounts' for the share of real exchange rate movements attributable to deviations from the PPP in traded goods. The accounting exercise is based on a straightforward application of the definition of aggregate price indexes. To be specific, express the (log) aggregate price index as a weighted-average of traded (T), and nontraded (N) goods prices, i.e., 
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by equation 1 is that the domestic relative price of non-traded goods is only part of y. For the domestic relative price of non-traded goods to have an impact on real exchange rate movements, the foreign relative price of non-traded goods must not move similarly. The primary objective of the accounting exercise is to apportion variation in the real exchange rate into shares attributed to variation in x, and variation in y, separately.
Before presenting the decompositions, Table 1 presents some summary data comparing the countries examined in this study to those studied by Engel (1999) . In the first column annual average real GDP growth since 1975 is tabulated. The economies in the upper panel have (with the exception of Malaysia) generally doubled the growth performance of the higher income economies in Engel's sample. In the second column note that income levels, as measured by real per-capita GDP, are on average barely half those in Engel's study. Finally, openness -as measured by the sum of exports and imports relative to GDP -is given in column 3. As noted above, the Asian-Pacific economies are generally more open. In principle at least, these differences in economic circumstances may have contributed to very different roles for deviations from the law of one price, and relative shifts in internal relative prices (i.e., x and y shares) in the real exchange rate movements of these East Asian economies. It would however, be misleading to claim these implicit criticisms are novelindeed, Engel discusses them briefly in his conclusion.
The approach in this paper follows Engel (1999) closely. The proportion of real exchange rate movements that can be accounted for by movements in the relative price of non-traded goods is computed for each bilateral currency pair, and the decomposition is done at all possible horizons that the data allow -from one month up to 25 years. Perhaps surprisingly, the evidence presented here is broadly similar to that obtained from high-income U.S. based real exchange rates. In particular, relative prices of non-traded goods appear to account for virtually none of the movement of Pacific Rim real exchange rates. This pattern appears unaffected by the cross-sectional variation in either income level, or the degree of openness present among these Pacific-Rim economies. The only exception to these findings occurs when we examine fixed (or semi-fixed) exchange rate regimes separately, and when we focus on the drift in real exchange rates (as opposed to measures of variance or mean squared 4 error). However, the primary exception (the Hong Kong dollar) appears anomalous compared to other managed currencies within the sample, and, as will be discussed below, to the recent findings of Mendoza (2000) .
Traded and Non-Traded Price Indexes
The first step in the decomposition of real exchange rate movements is constructing traded and non-traded price indexes. This study uses consumer price index data from six Asia-Pacific countries: Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand; and the United States, to construct measures of traded and non-traded goods prices for each country. One advantage of obtaining data from higher income countries is that there is more data, and often of better quality. Hence, Engel (1999) was able to construct (and decompose) five separate measures of real exchange rates -using consumer prices, producer prices, etc. His findings were virtually identical across all measures. Additionally, in a related exercise, Isard and Symansky (1996) construct three annual measures of real exchange rates for each of the economies studied here. Again, these authors find their conclusions robust to the alternative measures. Thus in this study we focus on consumer prices exclusively.
As in Engel (1999) , geometric weights for major components of the "all items" series were estimated from logarithmic regressions of the form
where, cpi = cpi -all items, rent = cpi -rent, etc., and the geometric weight for rent is computed residually as:
For each currency, the number of separate components of traded goods, and non-traded goods (generally services) varies (between one and three) according to the data available.
Then the traded and non-traded price indexes are computed as In general, traded goods price indexes consist of each country's aggregate "goods" components of the CPI, while the non-traded goods price indexes consist of the services and rent components. Wherever possible, the non-traded price indexes exclude obvious traded goods components, e.g., rent, excluding fuel and power. In the end, these remain imperfect measures. However, Engel (1999) suggests that the effects of such miss-measurement are not serious for accounting purposes. This conclusion is based on several robustness checks.
First, he presents results using five different measures of traded-and non-traded goods prices.
Second, he examines one case in detail (Japan), for which data on marketing services is available. And finally, he explicitly examines the size of the bias on his estimates of α and β .
In short, his conclusions remain the same in all cases.
The next step is to construct the real exchange rates and the traded, and non-traded components, x and y (in equation 1). In this study, it is possible to construct twenty-one real exchange rates -six bilateral U.S. real exchange rates plus fifteen cross-rates. Appendix figures 1 and 2 plot the nominal and real exchange rates separately. Two aspects of appendix figure 1 are notable. First, the reaction to the recent currency crisis (1997-98) was varied, with some nominal exchange rates (especially the HK dollar/US dollar) remaining relatively stable.
And related, the response does not merely depend on the particular institutional exchange rate arrangement. Appendix figure 2 reveals some cases of extended trend movements as well as the relatively large real exchange rate movements associated with that crisis.
The focus of this study is on accounting for the movements in the real exchange rates depicted in appendix figure 2. In particular, we wish to attribute shares of the historical movement in real exchange rates to movements in traded goods prices (x), and non-traded goods prices (y). It is to this that we now turn. 
Accounting for Real Exchange Rates
Movements in the real exchange rate q may be due to movements in (i) the trend (drift), (ii) the variance, or comprehensively, (iii) the mean-squared error. In each case it is possible to decompose movements into parts attributable to traded goods (x, in equation 1), and to non-traded goods (y, in equation 1). First consider the drift.
a. The drift in the real exchange rate
The average one-month drift in the real exchange rate is equal to
. Then, the average n-month drift is simply q n∆ .
The time dimension is relevant since some theories may relate to the 'short-run', while others concern longer run movements. In this study, all possible horizons (i.e., 1 month to nmonths) that the data allow are considered. For the data examined here, the maximum value of n varies by country-pair. For the bilateral South Korea-U.S. real exchange rate, the longest n-period drift is 303 months, i.e., slightly more than 25 years. For country pairs involving Malaysia and Thailand there are considerably fewer observations, only 123 months.
Since the drift may be positive or negative, and thus potentially offsetting, we focus on the mean squared drift, 2 2 q n ∆ . The question we are interested in is how much of the squared drift in the real exchange rate is attributable to x. For this, we must decide how to treat comovements in x and y. For his data, Engel argued that the co-movements were small. This turns out to be the case for these data as well. A formal test was conducted by computing the ratio of the covariance of first differences in x to its variance, and testing whether that ratio was statistically different from zero. The t-statistic from the test was 1.44, not statistically different from zero at usual significance levels. Hence in subsequent calculations we ignore the covariance term. The drift decomposition can thus be written as:
Traded goods share of n-period drift = 2 2 2 2 2 2
7 Table 2 presents this drift decomposition for each of the 21 bilateral real exchange rates. First, note that the fraction of the drift attributable to the traded goods component varies considerably. In thirteen out of the twenty-one cases, drift in the relative price of traded goods accounts for virtually all (more than 80%) of the drift in the real exchange rate.
This is striking and essentially reproduces Engel's results. However, there are exceptions.
First, the two anomalous bilateral U.S. cases -Hong Kong, and Singapore -are
simultaneously the most open, richest, and among the fastest growing. Beyond this it is difficult to make generalizations -except noting that the importance of deviations from PPP varies widely. In the cases of the HK dollar/Thailand baht and Malaysian ringgit/Singapore dollar, variation in y appear very important indeed.
For most of the bilateral pairs studied, there is substantial evidence that drift in relative traded goods prices contributes significantly to the drift in real exchange rates we have observed. This implies substantial market segmentation among the economies studieddespite the relative importance of imports and exports in these economies. However, for about one-third of the bilateral real exchange rates we study, movements in the drift in nontraded goods prices has contributed as much or more to the overall drift in real exchange rates in the region as has the drift in relative traded goods prices. This evidence is new, however prior to interpretation we need a measure of how much of the total variation in exchange rates can be attributed to the drift. In order to address this we must first consider the second component of the variation in real exchange rates. We come back to the issue of the contribution of drift to total variation in section 3d below.
b. The Variance of the real exchange rate
A second aspect of real exchange rate movement is its variance. We can consider the fraction of the n-period variance accounted for by x. As discussed by Engel (1999) , the nperiod sample variance has extreme small-sample bias for large n. Thus we follow Engel and adopt the (small sample, unbiased) measure proposed by Cochrane (1988) 3 : 
Figure 1 presents these decompositions graphically for all twenty-one real exchange rates. Note that the horizontal axis measures the horizon. Here the message is stronger. In virtually all cases, at all horizons variation in traded goods prices accounts for essentially 100% of the variation in the real exchange rate. This is precisely the result Engel (1999) found for his industrial country sample. The only movement (in the panels of Figure 1 ) away from 100% are at the very long horizons. These longer horizons should be interpreted with caution. First, very few observations are used in the calculations and thus, the potential for single influential observations becomes greater. Second, at these longer horizons, the impact of the 1997-98 crisis becomes more important, since it is included in more and more of the sample data points. Hence, to the extent the 1997-98 crisis represented an 'unusual' event we might wish to put less weight on it. Finally, even in the cases with the fewest observations, the message is that at horizons out to eight years essentially all of the variation in the real exchange rate comes from variation in traded goods prices. We next turn to a comprehensive measure of real exchange rate variation.
c. The Mean Squared Error of the Real Exchange Rate
The mean squared error is the sum of drift and variance components. Hence the decomposition of the mean squared error (MSE) is:
Traded goods share of n-period MSE = ) ( ) ( ) (
Figure 2 presents these decompositions. The message from figure 2 is exactly the same as from the variance decompositions, i.e., virtually 100% of the total variation (MSE) of the twenty-one real exchange rates we consider is contributed by variation in traded goods 9 prices. This is true at all horizons the data allow, from one month to over twenty-five years.
The Malaysian ringgit represents a possible exception to the above generalizations. That is at horizons above 100 months, the importance of variation in x drops off precipitously relative to total variation in q. This is somewhat anomalous, and undoubtedly reflects the effect of the crisis period. Finally, and more generally, note the absence of apparent systematic with the cross-sectional variation in openness, income level, or (nominal) exchange rate regime.
These results should come as a surprise. If PPP held, x should be a constant and therefore contribute nothing to an explanation of variations in the real exchange rate. A primary motivation for examining the East Asian currencies in this study was an apparent difference in the economic conditions and experiences of these economies as compared to the experience of high-income, moderately growing economies previously examined. Yet we conclude that even in this special case, the data offer very little support for any of the theories of real exchange rate behavior that rely on variation in relative non-traded goods prices -at least as they apply to the time horizons considered here. We make several further attempts at reconciling these results before concluding.
d. Reconciliation
An outstanding issue discussed above relates to the contribution of the drift in overall real exchange rate variation. According to Table 2 , a substantial part of the drift in the real exchange rate could, for a third of the real exchange rates examined, be attributed to drift in relative non-traded goods prices. Yet, according to Figure 2 , virtually 100% of the total variation in the real exchange rate (as measured by the MSE) was due to variation in relative traded goods prices. For these two observations to be true, it must be the case that the drift accounts for a relatively small part of the total variation in real exchange rates. Table 3 presents one relevant summary statistic: the average drift contribution to the MSE for each exchange rate. The data support the conjecture -the maximum contribution of the drift is 18% for the Korean won/U.S. dollar real exchange rate, and except for two other cases, this contribution is always in single digits. Hence, there is no inconsistency between Tables 2 and   3 . Nonetheless, the results in Table 2 present a quite different picture than those in Engel (1999) . Unfortunately, it is not obvious what institutional or structural features may be responsible for the differences in the traded goods component highlighted there.
Another issue noted in the introduction is the role of fixed exchange rates. Under flexible exchange rates, the variability of the exchange rate could swamp variability in the two national currency traded goods price indexes. Thus, the dominance of the traded goods component of the real exchange rate would be driven by variability in the nominal exchange rate. In fixed exchange rate regimes, this cannot be the case. Hence, it would indeed be surprising if traded goods prices were necessarily more variable, and thus were always the dominant driver of real exchange rates.
To isolate the impact of fixed (or nearly fixed) exchange rates, we look at the three cases of fixed, or semi-fixed exchange rates in our sample, i.e., the Hong Kong dollar, the There is another reason to examine the fixed exchange rate cases separately. In a related study, Mendoza (2000) finds that variability in the relative price of non-tradable goods account for up to 70 percent of the variability of the peso-dollar real exchange rate during periods in which Mexico had a managed exchange rate regime. Figure 3 presents the most evidence yet for the importance of variation in non-traded goods prices in real exchange rate movements. But even here, the evidence is not unanimous. For the Hong Kong dollar, variation in the relative price of non-traded goods approaches fifty percent (of the MSE) at six-year horizons, but at longer horizons (to seventeen years) declines back to twenty-five percent. However, note that even in this case, non-traded goods prices never approach the seventy-percent found by Mendoza (2000) , and the maximum effect for the Hong Kong dollar occurs at much longer horizons than for the peso (six years versus six months). More formally, it is possible to test whether changes in these internal relative price ratios are comparable across countries. Table 4 presents the p-values and number of observations used to compute the test statistic, from such tests for three horizons: 1 month, 6 months, and 1 year. At the one month horizon, the only cases where internal relative prices move dissimilarly are bilateral pairs involving Hong Kong. That is, the difference in relative price movements is statistically different from zero (at the 5% level) only for the U.S., Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand relative to Hong Kong. In the remaining seventeen bilateral cases we cannot reject that the difference in relative price movements is zero. Interestingly, for these bilateral pairs, there does not seem to be a tendency for these internal relative price trends to converge as we look at longer horizons. Finally, the conclusions are similar when looking across the columns.
The exception for Hong Kong is hinted at in the MSE decompositions. In the first panel in Figure 2 the curve begins near 100% and drops to about 80% before beginning to rise 12 toward 100% again. This is one of the most pronounced movements in all the figures.
However, since the curve remains near 100% overall, it must be the case that variation in traded goods prices dwarfs this internal price difference. Overall then, Table 4 supports the conclusion that cross-country offsetting movements in internal relative prices have been the exception rather than the rule -at least for the horizons considered in this paper.
Conclusion
This study examined the proportion of real exchange rate movements that can be attributed to movements in the relative price of non-traded goods among twenty-one bilateral Asian-Pacific real exchange rates, for as far back historically as the data permits. Three decompositions of real exchange rate movements were examined: drift, variance, and mean squared error. Following Engel (1999) , the decomposition is done at all possible horizons that the data allow -from one month up to 25 years.
The evidence presented here is generally consistent with that from high-income U.S. based real exchange rates. In particular, relative prices of non-traded goods appear to account for virtually none of the movement of Pacific Rim real exchange rates. This pattern is unaffected by the cross-sectional variation in either income level or the degree of openness present among these Pacific-Rim economies.
The exceptions to these results are in accounting for movements in real exchange rates. For a third of the bilateral Asian-Pacific real exchange rates studied, variation in the relative price of non-traded goods account for less than 60% of variation in the real exchange rate. This is very different from what Engel (1999) found in his sample of U.S. bilateral exchange rates. The second exception to the previous evidence is for Hong Kong -especially during the recent fixed exchange rate regime. In this case the importance of variation in relative traded goods prices declines from seventy-five percent to fifty-percent (at six years) before rising back to seventy-five percent. This is reminiscent of the result found by Mendoza (2000) for the Mexican peso under managed exchange rate periods. However, in contrast to his results, the other two pegged, or managed, currencies studied here do not demonstrate this pattern. Moreover, the pattern exhibited by the Hong Kong dollar is more protracted (the 13 maximum impact of non-traded goods relative prices occurs at six years), and is smaller than for the case of the peso. Additionally, statistically significant differences in trends in internal relative price movements occur only in the case of Hong Kong. These differences suggest that examining more cases of purely fixed exchange rates in future research may prove fruitful in uncovering more cross-country variation in these accounting exercises.
Finally, one issue mentioned only briefly is that of measurement error. If traded goods are bundled with non-traded services, and deviations in the former are stationary while those in the latter are non-stationary, then the decompositions examined in this paper need to be interpreted with caution. Indeed, general problems with aggregate price indexes have been noted in two recent papers examining persistence. First, Imbs, Mumtaz, Ravn, and Rey (2002) suggest that heterogeneity among the products within the aggregate price index seriously bias persistence estimates upwards. In particular, OLS weights the more persistent component more heavily, thus biasing the persistence estimate. They term this an aggregation bias. This bias could, in principle, be a problem for the accounting exercises in this paper also. Second, an additional bias is suggested by Taylor (2000) . He argues that persistence estimates are biased upward due to 'temporal' aggregation biases -the fact that all prices are not collected at the same time during the month. Both of these biases suggest the data is poor -and it clearly influences the inferences one makes. 
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